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Patent-Eligible Processes: An
Audience Perspective
Timothy R. Holbrook*
Mark D. Janis*
ABSTRACT
Many of the problems with modern patent-eligibility analysis
can be traced back to a fundamental philosophical divide between
judges who treat eligibility as the primary tool for effectuating patent
policy and those who take patent-eligibility as nothing more than a
coarse filter to be invoked in rare cases. After several years in which
the coarse filter approach seemed to have the upper hand, the
eligibility-as-king approach now is firmly in ascendancy. This Article,
resists that trend, exploring more centrist approaches to patent-
eligibility, particularly in the context of process inventions. This
Article first examines the practice of undertaking an eligibility analysis
with no antecedent claim construction; then concludes that this
practice is problematic, drawing on the authors'prior work concerning
the design of patent law rules in view of the audience for those rules.
This Article also assesses the unfortunate renaissance of the "inventive
concept" inquiry, arguing that the Court's new embrace of that inquiry
is a mistake that permits judges to privilege eligibility to the virtual
exclusion of all other patentability doctrines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the US Supreme Court rediscovered patent eligibility.
Nearly three decades of silent acquiescence 2 gave way to five years of
1. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
2. Punctuated three times, in unusual ways. In 1999, when the Court denied a petition
for certiorari in Excel Communications v. AT&T Corp., Justice Stevens took the unusual step of
writing a "[s]tatement ... respecting the denial of the petition," stating that "[tlhe importance of
the question presented in this certiorari petition makes it appropriate to reiterate the fact that
the denial of the petition does not constitute a ruling on the merits." Excel Commc'ns, Inc. v.
AT&T Corp., 528 U.S. 946, 946 (1999). In the case below, the Federal Circuit had found eligible a
method for adding data to a message record for long distance phone calls. See AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court considered 35 U.S.C. § 101 in J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., holding that patents directed to various
plants and seeds were eligible for utility patent protection even if they were eligible for
protection under the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act. See J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001). J.E.M., however, was more
concerned with policing the line between co-equal forms of federal intellectual property
protection than subject matter eligibility under Section 101. See id. at 143-44.
A few years later, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, wrote an
opinion dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The case was peculiar because the
certiorari petition did not squarely raise any eligibility issue, and certainly did not cite Section
101. It did pose the vague question: "Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite,
undescribed, and non-enabling step directing a party simply to 'correlat[e]' test results can
validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after
looking at a test result." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. 124 (No. 04-607),
2004 WL 2505526, at *i. Sua sponte, the Supreme Court transformed the case into an eligibility
case even though the issue had not been litigated below. The Court asked the Solicitor General to
express the views of the United States on whether "the patent [is] invalid because one cannot
patent 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas[.]"' Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 543 U.S. 1185, 1185 (2005). Although the Solicitor General argued that
the Court should deny the petition on the grounds that eligibility had not been raised in the
courts below, Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. 124 (No. 04-607),
2005 WL 2072283, at *15, the Court granted the petition anyway, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 999 (2005), and held oral argument, only later to dismiss
certiorari as improvidently granted. See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125. Dissenting from the
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patent eligibility hysterics. From 2010 through 2014, the Court heard
four patent eligibility cases.3 Each was a portentous affair. The
Solicitor General routinely appeared, dozens of amicus briefs were
filed,4 and the Court set out certiorari questions that sometimes
verged on the cosmic. 5 Commentators by the scores predicted that
each case augured the patent system's salvation 6-or its ruination. 7
That debate has only intensified in the wake of the Court's
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International decision and the scores of lower
court rulings applying Alice to strike down patent claims, frequently
via dismissals on the pleadings.8 However, while the Court's new
dismissal, Justice Breyer not only would have reached the merits, but he also would have found
the claims to fail the Section 101 requirement for eligible subject matter. See id. at 125 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court's laterest in
Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 64 (2013) (noting the Supreme Court's significant involvement in
substantive patent law issues since the time of the Lab. Corp. dismissal).
3. In addition to Bilski, the Court decided Mayo, Myriad, and Alice. Alice Corp. Pty. v.
CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
4. Forty-two in Alice alone. See Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/alice-corporation-pty-ltd-v-cls-bank-
international/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
5. In Myriad, the question presented, as accepted by the Court's grant of certiorari,
was "[a]re human genes patentable," even though the case did not present that question. See
Brief for Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 353961, at *1 ("The question
presented is: Are human genes patentable?"); see also Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012) (granting writ of certiorari "limited to Question 1
presented by the petition"); cf. In re Roslin Inst., 750 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(pondering the nature of a "clone" for purposes of assessing Section 101 eligibility).
6. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 390998, at *4 ('Patents on human
genes impede the provision of health care, thwart public health objectives, shackle innovation,
and violate ethical tenets. Patents are not needed to create an incentive for the discovery of
human genes, and patent law does not exist to reward such scientific and medical discoveries.").
7. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae the Biotechnology Industry Organization in
Support of Respondents, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1209142, at *3 ("This is
particularly true where, as here, Congress has already declined to create the exception that
Ostrer seeks, and where such a change would make the United States the only developed
country to take such a restrictive view of patent eligibility-a result with potentially grave
consequences for America's global economic and scientific leadership in biotechnology."); Pete
Meldrum, Myriad Genetics, the Supreme Court, Gene Patents, and Saving Lives, MYRIAD (Apr.
11, 2013), http://www.myriad.com/myriad-genetics-the-supreme-court-gene-patents-and/
("Without the patents, our work would not have been possible. We would not have been able to
raise the funds necessary to decode the genes, design and deliver the tests, interpret the results,
and help patients.").
8. See, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n,
No. 2013-1588, 2014 WL 7272219, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014) (affirming grant of motion to
dismiss based on Section 101 eligibility); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also
McRO, Inc. v. Atlus U.S.A., No. SACV 13-1870-GW(FFMx), 2014 WL 4772196, at *12 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 22, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (c)).
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eligibility jurisprudence has set loose substantial doctrinal chaos and
has generated intensive scholarly discussions,9 it is doubtful whether
this frenetic outpouring of law has advanced the goals of the patent
system. It is particularly doubtful that the Court has enriched our
understanding of the goals and mechanisms of the eligibility analysis.
Some decades from now, or perhaps even sooner, scholars may well
look back on the Court's eligibility junket as a grand fiasco.
Many of the problems with modern patent-eligibility analysis
can be traced back to a fundamental philosophical divide that has
crystallized at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, as that
court has attempted to implement the Supreme Court's eligibility
jurisprudence. One school of thought takes patent-eligibility as the
uber-doctrine of patentability, the chief vessel through which
transformative shifts in patent policy are effectuated. 10 A competing
school of thought rejects this patent-eligibility-as-king mantra, taking
patent eligibility as nothing more than a coarse filter to be invoked in
rare and extreme cases; other doctrines distinguish between
inventions that should be patented and those that should not be.u
Under this approach, an invention is ineligible for potential patent
protection only if the evidence "exhibit[s] itself so manifestly as to
override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and
the statutory context that directs primary attention on the
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act." 12 Taken to an
9. See. e.g., Symposium, The Future of Patents: Bilski and Beyond, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1245 (2011). The articles in this symposium issue barely scratch the surface.
10. For example, according to Judge Mayer, "Section 101 is the gateway to the Patent
Act for good reason. It is the sentinel, charged with the duty of ensuring that our nation's patent
laws encourage, rather than impede, scientific progress and technological innovation."
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 718 (Mayer, J., concurring). "Subject matter eligibility challenges
provide the most efficient and effective tool for clearing the patent thicket, weeding out those
patents that stifle innovation and transgress the public domain." See id. at 719. Judge Mayer
would even require courts to undertake the eligibility analysis at the outset of the litigation,
analogizing eligibility to threshold issues of jurisdiction. See id. at 717; see also MySpace, Inc. v.
GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("The issue of
whether a claimed method meets the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in 35
U.S.C. § 101 is an 'antecedent question' that must be addressed before this court can consider
whether particular claims are invalid as obvious or anticipated."); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,
973-75 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (deciding eligibility when the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
had not considered it).
11. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
see also Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc'ns Inc., No. 2:13-CV-07245-MRP, 2014 WL 5661290,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) ("On occasion, the Federal Circuit has described § 101 as a 'coarse
eligibility filter,' barring only 'manifestly abstract' inventions and leaving §§ 102, 103, and 112 as
the finer sieves. But in its last few terms, the Supreme Court has indicated that patentability is
a higher bar." (citations omitted)).
12. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132
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extreme, the "coarse filter" approach might reduce the eligibility
criterion to a veritable dead letter, critics have warned.13
Some may regard the eligibility-as-omnipotent-king and
eligibility-as-dead-letter philosophies as primitive caricatures, at least
as depicted here. Regardless, they act as emblems of the extreme
polarization that characterizes the modern eligibility debate, a debate
that seems to have reached impasse even as the courts have shifted to
an eligibility-as-king model in the immediate wake of Alice. These
models-or caricatures, as they may be-also provide a jumping-off
point for this Article's articulation of a more nuanced, centrist
approach to patent-eligibility. This Article focuses on a centrist
approach to implementing the abstract ideas exception to eligibility,
most often invoked in relation to process inventions.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reassesses the
eligibility impasse by considering the perspective of the ultimate
audience-the community of innovators-on which eligibility rules are
supposed to act. Part II begins by examining how the courts got to
impasse, focusing on the checkered history of the abstract ideas
exception; then it revisits the audience perspective on patent
rulemaking and the corresponding proximity-complexity matrix that
the authors elaborated in prior work. The Article reexamines the
eligibility analysis from this audience perspective, identifying some
indicia that eligibility jurisprudence suffers from an unaddressed
proximity problem.
Parts III and IV offer particular illustrations showing why this
characteristic of eligibility analysis is a concern and explores how
courts might focus their efforts in addressing the concern. Part III
discusses the controversial relationship between the eligibility inquiry
and the claim construction process, and argues that decoupling
S.Ct. 2431 (2012). The subsequent Ultramercial panel opinion addressed the abstractness
exception to eligibility. See Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1327.
13. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012) (warning of this possibility). Some scholars addressing the Federal Circuit's State Street
Bank decision had opined that the Federal Circuit had indeed turned eligibility into a dead
letter, at least as to software-implemented inventions and business methods. See, e.g., John R.
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1160 (1999) ("[Slection
101 seemingly bars few, if any, applications for patent. After State Street, it is hardly an
exaggeration to say that if you can name it, you can claim it."); cf. Michael Risch, Everything Is
Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 609-10 (2008) (arguing business method patents should be
patentable if they satisfy other patentability criteria). In State Street Bank, the Federal Circuit
addressed the patentability of a system that implemented a "hub and spoke" arrangement for
financial services. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1998). The court held that the claimed invention satisfied the eligibility requirement
"because it produce[d] 'a useful, concrete, and tangible result'-a final share price momentarily
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequent trades." Id. at 1373.
2015] 353
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eligibility from claim construction is likely to exacerbate the proximity
problem. Part IV takes up the interaction between eligibility and
prior art doctrines, focusing primarily on the unfortunate renaissance
of the "inventive concept" inquiry in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Labs, Inc. and Alice. Informed by concerns over
proximity, the Article argues that the Court's embrace of the inventive
concept inquiry is a mistake. The Court adopted a better approach
decades ago in Diamond v. Diehr, when it all but discarded the
inventive step inquiry. The Article concludes that the audience
perspective offers some new ideas that may help courts develop a
centrist approach to the abstract ideas exception to patent eligibility.
II. REASSESSING THE ELIGIBILITY IMPASSE FOR PROCESS INVENTIONS
A. Twice Reaching Impasse: Benson-to-Diehr and Its Echo in Modern
Eligibility Jurisprudence
In her opinion dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-part in the
en banc decision in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp., Judge
Newman lamented the condition of Section 101 eligibility
jurisprudence. In a section of her opinion labeled "Today's Impasse,"
she noted that "the en banc court undertook to remedy distortions
flowing from inconsistent precedent on section 101," and concluded,
flatly, that "[tihis remedial effort has failed."14
It is worth considering how the Federal Circuit-and, indeed,
the Supreme Court-arrived at this point. Process inventions have
long troubled the courts, especially when those claims have been
challenged for compliance with the requirement for Section 101
subject matter eligibility. In the older cases, many process inventions
fell into either of two categories. The first category included processes
that were intended for machine implementation. Courts generally
held these claims to define eligible subject matter if they indicated
some effort to specify machine components, and if they did not, courts
might strike the claims down, probably based on concerns
about impermissible abstractness. 15 The second category included
chemical processes. These claims were upheld as satisfying the
eligibility criterion if they reflected actions taken on physical
14. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
15. See Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840).
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substances-loosely speaking, a transformation, even if no chemical
reaction was involved.16
This traditional approach-the machine or transformation safe
harbors against impermissible abstractness-proved challenging to
apply to software-implemented processes. Presented with the issue
for the first time, the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson17
declined to lash itself exclusively to the machine or transformation
safe harbors: "It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to
a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles
or materials to a 'different state or thing.' We do not hold that no
process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of
our prior precedents."18 Instead, the Court endorsed an inquiry that
permitted nearly untrammeled discretionary judgments into whether
the patent at issue "would wholly pre-empt [a] mathematical formula
and in practical effect [be] a patent on the algorithm itself."19
The Benson Court's apparent preference for an open-ended
preemption standard over more concrete machine-or-transformation
rules held true in its next software eligibility case, Parker v. Flook,20
but then dissipated three years later in Diehr.21 The Flook majority
fought against a "narrow reading of Benson" and used the full
measure of discretion afforded under Benson's amorphous preemption
analysis to interject the proposition that the discovery of a
phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula could not support
patent-eligibility "unless there is some other inventive concept" in the
application of that phenomenon or formula. 22 But the signs of a
potential impasse were evident. Three justices dissented, finding that
the claimed process in Flook "clearly" met the Section 101 eligibility
standard and that Benson stood for "no more than [the]
long-established principle" that "laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are ineligible subject matter.23 Then, in Diehr,
this view of Benson garnered a majority of votes. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the majority recited the laws of nature, natural
16. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876) (upholding claim to a process
for removing impurities from flour by use of air blasts); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
252, 271 (1853) (upholding claim for improvement in cast-iron manufacturing).
17. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
18. Id. at 71.
19. Id. at 72.
20. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
21. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
22. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593-94.
23. Id. at 598-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenters also lambasted the majority
for striking "an equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by importing into its
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness." Id. at 600 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See infra Part TV for our discussion of this problem from an audience perspective.
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phenomena, and abstract idea exclusions, and averred that "[o]ur
recent holdings in [Benson and Flook] stand for no more than these
long-established principles." 24  Four dissenting justices took the
majority to task, asserting that the majority's analysis contained
"major flaws," 25 among them the failure to apply Flook correctly. 26
And this was the last word from the Supreme Court on the eligibility
of methods for nearly three decades. 27
Whether Diehr brought the law to uneasy d6tente or utter
impasse may be debated. But it is difficult to imagine any persuasive
argument that the patent system would be well-served by replaying
the Benson-to-Flook-to-Diehr tug-of-war between rules and standards.
Nonetheless, that is precisely what has emerged in the Court's modern
patent eligibility jurisprudence. 28  Bilski v. Kappos,29 which was
predicted to be a watershed, turned out to be a reincarnation of
Benson.3 0 In particular, the Court's opinion in Bilski downplayed the
24. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
25. Id. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority and dissent also carried
forward the debate about whether there was any place for an inventive concept inquiry in
eligibility analysis. See infra Part IV.
27. The Supreme Court decided another patentable subject matter case between Flook
and Diehr, holding five-to-four that a genetically modified bacterium was patentable subject
matter. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). Chakrabarty dealt with whether
the bacterium was a composition of matter or an article of manufacture, not a process. For our
purposes, Chakrabarty is significant as the source of the trope that "anything under the sun that
is made by man" is patent eligible. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP.
No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Dyk, J., concurring) (completing the quotation to include the
phrase "but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title
are fulfilled" and asserting that "[a]lthough this passage has been used by our court in past cases
to justify a broad interpretation of patentable subject matter, . . . when read in context, the
statement undercuts the notion that Congress intended to expand the scope of § 101").
28. This is not to ignore the development of Section 101 doctrine at the Federal Circuit.
The court's expansive view of patent-eligible subject matter was at its apex in State Street Bank,
where the Federal Circuit adopted an eligibility test that inquired whether the invention had a
"useful, concrete, and tangible result." See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp.,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Federal Circuit also rejected a per se rule
excluding business methods from eligibility. See id. at 1375 ("We take this opportunity to lay this
ill-conceived exception to rest."). Within a decade, the Federal Circuit began a gradual retreat
from its State Street Bank eligibility test, reading the tea leaves from Justice Breyer's dissent
from the dismissal of certiorari in Lab. Corp. See supra note 2. The Federal Circuit's shift on
eligibility was most evident in a trio of cases: In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
revised and superseded by 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009), In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2007), and Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
29. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010).
30. Some commentators criticized the Court for failing to give sufficient guidance. See,
e.g., Richard H. Stern, Bilski: A "Flipped" Vote and Then a Damp Squib, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 115, 117-18 (criticizing Bilski majority opinion because it "does not remotely guide the
356
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machine-or-transformation test; characterizing it as "an important
and useful clue" for subject matter eligibility,31 but inadequate to
serve as "the sole criterion for determining the [subject matter
eligibility] of inventions in the Information Age." 32 As it had done in
Benson, the Court in Bilski endorsed a discretionary, open-ended
standard, expressly rejecting the use of categorical rules.3 Indeed,
the Court went to great lengths to avoid formulating rules that might
dictate decisions in future cases:
The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the unpatentability
of abstract ideas. The Court, therefore, need not define further what constitutes a
patentable "process," beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in § 100(b)
and looking to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.3 4
The Court invited the Federal Circuit to explore the parameters of this
discretionary inquiry-at least in the direction of limiting the scope of
eligibility-without specifying what those parameters were.35
In Mayo, the Court took full advantage of this generous
measure of discretion to reprise the "inventive concept" analysis from
Flook.36  The Supreme Court then doubled-down in Alice37  in
embracing the "inventive concept" analysis of Flook and Mayo. The
Court held that its two-step methodology in Mayo is the methodology
to be applied in all Section 101 contexts and for all exclusions, 38
including assessing whether the "inventive concept" is "sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than
a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."39 The Court rejected any
Federal Circuit and other lower courts on how to determine whether the subject-matter of a
claim is too abstract").
31. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603.
32. Id. at 605.
33. See id. at 609 ("Rather than adopting categorical rules that might have wide-
ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of this
Court's decisions in Beason, Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners' claims are not
patentable processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas."). Justice Stevens,
joined by three other justices, would have adopted a categorical rule excluding "business
methods" from eligibility. See id. at 657 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). It is widely
believed that Justice Stevens' opinion had originally attracted a majority of votes and would
have been the Court's opinion. See Stern, supra note 30, at 117.
34. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612.
35. See id. at 612-13 ("In disapproving an exclusive machine-or-transformation test, we
by no means foreclose the Federal Circuit's development of other limiting criteria that further
the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.").
36. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012). See infra Part IV for a fuller discussion and critique.
37. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
38. See id. at 2355 ("In [Mayo], we set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.").
39. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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effort to distinguish the claims based on their formats-method,
system, or computer-readable medium. 40 Finally, the Court explained
that "the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention."41
In the great wave of lower court decisions applying Alice, most
courts have concluded that the patent claims at issue before them did
not define eligible subject matter under the two-part Alice test. Yet,
this near unanimity in outcomes masks some fundamental tensions,
and some evidence of these tensions is already appearing, even in the
short time since Alice was decided. First, the nominal two-part Alice
test already shows some signs of collapsing into a one-part test that
centers on the inventive concept inquiry or some related quasi-novelty
inquiry. 42 Second, the Alice test has emboldened at least one Federal
Circuit judge to adopt a categorical exclusion for any subject matter
perceived to lie outside the "technological arts," notwithstanding the
fact that the Supreme Court seemed to have rejected categorical
approaches to eligibility in Bilski.43
The larger question is this: what should the Court do to break
its eligibility jurisprudence out of these seemingly endless
iterations-between open standards and categorical rules, between
eligibility-as -king and eligibility-as- dead-letter? The following Section
suggests that the Court redirect its energies towards considering more
closely how eligibility rules are communicated to the community of
innovators-that is, the Court should reconsider eligibility from an
audience perspective.
B. The Eligibility Impasse as a Proximity Problem
The Supreme Court's decisions have been criticized as
impenetrable, offering little guidance to the US Patent and
40. See id. at 2360 ("[Tlhe system claims are no different from the method claims in
substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the
system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the
same idea.").
41. Id. at 2358.
42. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text (noting and critiquing this collapse).
43. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (relying on a "technological arts" exclusion under which claims directed to an
"entrepreneurial objective" as opposed to a technological one are excluded from eligibility); see
also DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., No. 2013-1505, 2014 WL 6845152, at *17 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 5, 2014) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (relying again on a "technological arts" exclusion). In
Ultramercial, Judge Mayer attempted to demonstrate that a categorical technological arts
exclusion would comport with Bilski and Alice in light of the invitation in Alice to the Federal
Circuit to craft a test that was "narrower" than a categorical exclusion of all business methods.
See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 721-22 (Mayer, J., concurring). To suggest that the technological
arts exclusion is an example of a narrower test is quite a feat of sophistry.
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Trademark Office (PTO), courts, lawyers, and scientists.4 4 The focus
has been on the language and structure of the legal tests, or lack
thereof, that the Supreme Court has provided.
But such a focus on complexity may in fact be misplaced.
Discerning what technologies should be eligible for patent protection
necessarily involves some difficult factual considerations. Thus, the
debate and impasse over patentable subject matter may not be
entirely a complexity problem. Instead, the issue may be one of
proximity.
1. The Proximity Problem in General
Why has it been so difficult for patent law to modulate its rules
vs. standards conflicts? The answer lies partly in matters of
institutional design. Studies that examine the dialogue between the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 4 5 the administrative interface
between the Federal Circuit and the PTO,4 6 and even the courts and
Congress47 will surely help explain the difficulties and contribute
potential responses.
Another route may also be productive: reexamining the nature
of patent law pronouncements themselves. This was our focus in
Patent Law's Audience.4 8  There, we argued that, while patent law
pronouncements, whether in the form of rules or standards, are
44. See, e.g., Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc'ns Inc., No. 2:13-CV-07245-MRP, 2014
WL 5661290, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) ("Yet Alice did not answer the bigger questions, only
incrementally clarifying § 101. . . .Alice failed to answer this: when, if ever, do computer patents
survive § 101?"); Timothy R. Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court About to Rule That Software Is
Ineligible for Patent Protection?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/16/is-the-supreme-court-about-to-rule-that-
software-is-ineligible-for-patent-protection/ ("[I]n the area of patentable subject matter, the
Supreme Court's decisions have been a disaster. The Court has created mass confusion, making
it almost impossible to discern whether certain innovations, particularly as to software, are
patentable.").
45. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the
Supreme Court-And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 793-94 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza,
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1440-42 (2012).
46. See, e.g., Sara Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 831, 840-41 (2012); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1966-67 (2013). With regards to
eligibility specifically, see John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice,
89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1042-44 (2011).
47. See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2014)
(examining the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress concerning patent law).
48. Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent Law's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72
(2012).
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frequently criticized for their befuddling complexity, 49 the existence of
complexity by itself is not necessarily problematic. Rather, complexity
becomes problematic when coupled with unfavorable "proximity."50
Proximity, as defined in Patent Law's Audience, is a measure of
the virtual distance between the source of a legal pronouncement and
its ultimate intended audience.5 1 In more practical terms, unfavorable
proximity exists where the message embedded in a legal
pronouncement is likely to be transmitted and retransmitted among
multiple parties as it travels from source to audience, 52 posing the risk
that the message will be altered substantively along the way as
parties translate and recode it.53 Problems of proximity may derive
from the nature of the law's intended audience, e.g., where the
audience is heterogeneous, diffuse, or lacking sophistication. They
may also reflect the efficacy of intermediaries that reside in the space
between the source of law and the audience. 54
The proximity-complexity matrix provides a new platform for
understanding patent law rules, and potentially for redesigning them.
Patent Law's Audience identified a deficiency common to many areas
of problematic patent law jurisprudence: courts pronouncing on patent
law often reflexively seek solutions to the law's complexity without
adequately addressing proximity.55  This insight might be useful
instrumentally, in that courts might redirect their energies towards
improving proximity by refining, or redesigning, the network of
intermediaries through which patent law passes.56
These ideas ought to be applied to modern patent-eligibility
jurisprudence, as discussed in the next Section.
49. See id. at 80-82. The authors have a capacious view of complexity, encompassing
patent law pronouncements that are facially complex, usually by including technical concepts in
their express language, or facially simple but complex in application.
50. See id. at 77-80 (explaining proximity); id. at 82-84 (describing the proximity-
complexity tradeoff).
51. Id. at 77-80.
52. See id. at 78. Patent Law's Audience observed that patent law developments might
well be transmitted through a convoluted, informal network of venture capitalists, patent
professionals, journalists, academics, technical managers, and others before reaching a given
innovator. See id. at 86-89.
53. See id. Recoding is a risk that has social welfare consequences if one is to indulge
the standard assumption that patent law aspires to provide ex ante incentives that shape
innovators' investments in innovative activity. Recoding patent law's message might therefore
redirect investment in ways that the patent law rule as originally expressed did not necessarily
contemplate. Of course, that is not to say that recoding is invariably counterproductive. For
example, perhaps the recoding done in this Article will actually add some increment of value to
the otherwise raw mass of patent jurisprudence. Any patent law professional hoping to be paid
for his or her services surely takes a similar view.
54. See id. at 78.
55. See id. at 90-93.
56. See infra Part IV.
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2. Indicia of a Proximity Problem in Eligibility Jurisprudence
Two related aspects of the eligibility inquiry for process
inventions fuel the suspicion that current jurisprudence suffers from a
proximity problem and that addressing that problem might help
moderate excessive oscillations between eligibility- as-king and
eligibility-as-dead-letter philosophies.
First, while most patent rules attempt to account for both ex
ante incentives to innovators and ex post consequences for
downstream innovation,57 the preemption inquiry that dominates the
Supreme Court's eligibility jurisprudence for process inventions tilts
heavily towards the latter.58 By its very terms, it is predominantly
concerned with patent grants that might block downstream innovators
from access to fundamental building blocks needed for subsequent
innovation.59
The preemption analysis presents an odd dynamic. The focus
of the inquiry is the impact the patent will have on downstream
inventions and innovations. Yet, as a threshold issue, subject matter
eligibility needs to be readily assessable by innovators, or their
proxies, in deciding what research may result in patent-eligible
inventions. This threshold, ex ante consideration, is determined by
downstream, ex post consequences that may not be readily discernable
at the time of invention or when the inventor files an application.
Viewed from an audience perspective, the preemption inquiry
presents exceptional problems of proximity. The inquiry seeks to keep
the way clear for a group of yet-unknown future innovators, carrying
out a research agenda that we cannot yet imagine, operating in a
future economy whose innovation-related institutions may not even
have formed. The preemption inquiry is a hubristic exercise in
ruminations about the fundamental essence of both the existing world
(e.g., in identifying what constitutes an "abstract idea" and the
"inventive concept") and the future world (e.g., in deciding whether a
given claim of rights would block access to that abstract idea). It is
little wonder that the Court has floundered in its attempts to create
57. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 39-45 (2009) (discussing ex ante and ex post incentives created by doctrine
of equivalents).
58. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et. al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1329 (2011)
(suggesting that eligibility doctrine "is about encouraging cumulative innovation and furthering
societal norms regarding access to knowledge").
59. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) ("We have
described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption."); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) ("Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-
empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract
idea.").
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an eligibility regime that sends clear signals that actually promote
efficient investment decisions in innovation, or even influence those
decisions at all.
Moreover, the methodology embedded in the Supreme Court's
eligibility analysis is exceptional in that it lacks the constraints that
discipline virtually all other patentability rules.6 0 Other patentability
inquiries share a standard comparison methodology: they turn on
comparisons between the claims at issue and discrete pieces of
evidence, often textual evidence. This is true of the novelty and
nonobviousness inquiries, in which the comparison is to qualifying
prior art. It is also true of the Section 112(a) doctrines of enablement
and written description, which call for a comparison between the
claimed invention and the written description portion of the patent
document. 6 1
Yet no analogous comparison exercise constrains the eligibility
requirement. 62 For example, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that the use of merely conventional steps is not sufficient to create a
patent-eligible inventive concept. 63  The Supreme Court does not
discuss how it makes the assessment of what is "conventional" and the
evidence that may be used in making this determination. 6 4 In an
exercise that is already excessively ambitious in its aspirations to
shape the future, there is virtually nothing to guide and focus the
judicial imagination.6 5 This dynamic becomes particularly salient
when considering the procedural posture of some of these
cases-motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), suggesting
60. This comparison between eligibility and patentability rules is valuable whether one
believes that eligibility is a type of patentability rule or not.
61. The inquiry into definiteness under Section 112(b) is slightly different. See Nautilus,
Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). While definiteness is a corollary to
claim construction, involving reference to the specification and prosecution history, the ultimate
inquiry-whether the claim term "inform[s] those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention with reasonable certainty"-is likely to involve some speculation about the general
cognitive capacities of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See id.
62. This is true even when the eligibility is preceded by a claim construction. Part III
examines the potential for proximity problems where there is no claim construction antecedent
to the eligibility inquiry.
63. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012) ("Thus, this step tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work in the field. Purely
'conventional or obvious' '[pre]-solution activity' is normally not sufficient to transform an
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law." (quoting Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978))).
64. See infra note 162 and accompanying text (critiquing the inventive step inquiry).
65. Presumably, those who endorse either an eligibility-as-king or an eligibility-as-dead-
letter philosophy might regard this extraordinary range of judicial discretion as a compelling
feature of modern eligibility jurisprudence. But the authors regard it as a bug, one that thwarts
efficiency and allows too much room for extreme oscillations in the eligibility jurisprudence.
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that no such facts as to the conventional are required in making this
assessment.
A second indicator of an ongoing proximity problem with the
Supreme Court's modern eligibility inquiry is that despite the fact
that eligibility rules purport to speak to a remote, future audience,
they are not anchored in any of the bridging heuristics that form the
most common strategy for dealing with a proximity problem. 66 In
particular, patent law's most common trope, the hypothetical person
having ordinary skill in the art, has been accorded no place in the
Supreme Court's modern eligibility cases. Nor have the courts relied
upon any other constructs, such as the reasonable competitor67 or the
reasonable patent attorney.68 As such, the preemption analysis is
devoid of any reference points or perspectives, effectively reducing the
inquiry to an exercise in judicial discretion. And, as detailed in Parts
III and IV, the Court's jurisprudence further subjugates the ordinary
artisan heuristic as that jurisprudence engages with, and in some
instances displaces, other inquiries where the ordinary artisan has
had greater influence.
III. TYING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION TO THE ELIGIBILITY INQUIRY
Perhaps as a consequence of the narrowing tendencies of
certiorari jurisdiction, the Court's pronouncements on patent
eligibility often seem to treat the inquiry in isolation. In real
litigation, however, the eligibility analysis is embedded with other
issues and may interact with those issues. One of the paramount
issues-and one for which interaction with eligibility is likely to be
especially important-is claim construction.
66. The analysis is further complicated by the fact that although the preemption
analysis purports to shield a future audience of downstream innovators, courts seem committed
to the proposition that eligibility analysis is to presume conditions as they existed as of the
application filing date. Otherwise, subject matter that was eligible when the application was
filed could be rendered ineligible merely by changes in the technological environment over the
passage of time. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (per curiam) (Moore, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, my colleagues' analysis imbues the § 101
inquiry with a time-dependency that is more appropriately the province of §§ 102 and 103....
But § 101 is not a moving target-claims should not become abstract simply through the passage
of time. Under my colleagues' approach, however, a system claim that passes § 101 when the
patent issues could later magically transform into an abstract idea simply because certain
computer hardware elements no longer seem inventive.").
67. See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 48, at 101-04 (discussing "reasonable competitor"
construct).
68. Cf. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their "Interpretive
Community": A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 385
(2008); see also Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1254-55 (2014) (discussing audiences and heuristics for
intellectual property infringement).
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However, the Court's recent eligibility jurisprudence offers no
guidance on the relationship between eligibility analysis and claim
construction. In particular, the issues are: (1) whether claim
construction should precede eligibility analysis as a matter of process;
and, relatedly, (2) whether claim construction should inform the
substance of eligibility analysis.
These are nettlesome issues. A flat rule requiring claim
construction as a predicate for any eligibility inquiry might dictate
that any litigation over the eligibility issue be postponed until after
the conclusion of a full-fledged Markman process. 69 This is no mere
procedural quibble. A patentee could invoke the need for a claim
construction process in order to delay the day of reckoning on
eligibility, thus impairing the patent challenger's use of eligibility as a
vehicle for summarily resolving the suit via a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
on the pleadings, for example. Now that the Supreme Court has
concluded that there are factual aspects to claim construction, 70 the
patentee may have a stronger argument for a Markrman hearing
because of the need for factually-based evidence. So situated, the
eligibility requirement may not be able to function effectively as a
quick-strike strategy against dubious patents-a serious problem for
those who view the eligibility requirement as one of the patent
system's paramount policy vehicles.7 '
69. At the least, it might suggest a truncated Markman process focusing on those claim
terms agreed to be pertinent to the eligibility question.
70. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
71. Somewhat different considerations apply when the claim construction question
arises in ex parte prosecution involving the eligibility issue. The PTO claim construction process
undertaken in ex parte proceedings is likely to be quite limited compared to that undertaken in
litigation, resting on the claim language itself and the written description portion of the patent
application, all analyzed under the PTO's "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard. The
PTO also purports to apply this approach in inter partes proceedings. See generally Dawn-Marie
Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office's "Broadest
Reasonable Interpretation" Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285 (2009) (criticizing the "broadest
reasonable construction" standard and suggesting that it generates different meanings of the
invention).
The PTO's guidance to examiners on the role of claim construction in eligibility has
been inconsistent. The interim guidelines implementing the Myriad decision seemed to endorse
a flat rule requiring its examiners to engage in claim construction prior to analyzing eligibility.
See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination
Policy, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corps (Mar. 4, 2014), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-mayo-guidance.pdf.
However, the subsequent iteration of the PTO's interim guidelines on post-Alice
eligibility skirt the issue. The guidelines do not call upon examiners to undertake a claim
construction as a threshold step prior to conducting the eligibility analysis. Instead, they instruct
examiners to begin the eligibility analysis by determining what the claim is "directed to." See
2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618, 74622 (Dec. 16,
2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-16/pdfl2014-29414.pdf. The extent
to which this involves claim interpretation is left unclear. The Guidelines remark that "[t]o
364
PATENT-ELIGIBLE PROCESSES
On the other hand, a rule that permits patent challengers
routinely to evade Markman processes and proceed directly to an
eligibility analysis presents its own problems. The claims provide the
reference point for both invalidity and infringement analyses; this
principle is central to the notice function that claims are supposed to
play. A patent-eligibility analysis that is not informed by any
antecedent claim construction might be considered a patent law non
sequitur. It might, at the very least, force an ill-considered claim
construction on the fly, under the dubious guise of applying eligibility
rules.
Faced with these unpalatable choices, the Federal Circuit has
thus far refused to commit to either course, instead attempting to
mediate this tension with a rule that appears to permit the court to do
whatever it wishes in any given case. The court's current approach
traces to its original opinion in Ultramercial v. Hulu.7 2 There, the
Federal Circuit reversed a lower court determination of ineligibility of
a method claim relating to online transactions. 73 The district court
had not undertaken a formal claim construction, but this was not
fatal, according to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit had "never
set forth a bright line rule requiring district courts to construe claims
before determining subject matter eligibility."74  As former Chief
Judge Rader's opinion explained it, because eligibility is a mere
"coarse eligibility filter," claim construction "may not always be
necessary for a § 101 analysis."75 This might be read to suggest a one-
way rule: that claim construction is not necessary en route to a finding
that a claim does define eligible subject matter. But in support of this
proposition, the court cited Bilski, noting that the Bilski Court had
found that the claimed subject matter failed the eligibility test, but
there had been no antecedent claim construction.
Nonetheless, the court hedged its rule in Ultramercial, noting
that while no formal claim construction was necessary in order to
dispose of the eligibility issue in the case, "[o]n many occasions, . . . a
definition of the invention via claim construction can clarify the basic
character of the subject matter of the invention. Thus, claim meaning
may clarify the actual subject matter at stake in the invention and can
properly interpret the claim, it is important to understand what the applicant has invented and
is seeking to patent." Id. But there is no other indication as to what this interpretation would
entail.
72. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
73. See id. at 1324-25 (reproducing claim 1 of the patent-in-suit).
74. Id. at 1325.
75. Id. at 1325-26 (quoting Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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enlighten, or even answer, questions about subject matter
abstractness." 76 This passage likely captures the reality in many
cases.
Although the Federal Circuit has continued to adhere to the
rule that formal claim construction is not absolutely required prior to
a Section 101 eligibility determination, it remains unclear whether an
eligibility determination with no claim construction will be the
exceptional case. For example, in Bancorp Services v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada, the Federal Circuit expressly endorsed the
Ultramercial rule regarding claim construction.77 But the court noted
that "it will ordinarily be desirable-and often necessary-to resolve
claim construction disputes prior to a § 101 analysis, for the
determination of patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the
basic character of the claimed subject matter."78 Indeed, the court
found that claim construction was necessary and proceeded to adopt
one, even though the lower court had not done so. 79 The Federal
Circuit's ambivalence about the need for claim construction
antecedent to an eligibility analysis sets the stage for courts to
decouple the claims altogether from the eligibility analysis. The
court's en banc decision in CLS Bank80 illustrates the chaos that can
ensue when judges exercise the freedom to wander from the claim
language in adjudicating eligibility. The invention in CLS Bank
involved "a computerized trading platform for exchanging obligations
in which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first and
second party so as to eliminate 'settlement risk."'81 The settlement risk
arises because one party may not pay their obligation, perhaps
because they no longer have the resources to satisfy the obligation.
The third party acts as a "middle person" who holds the obligations of
both parties prior to settlement, thus eliminating the risk.82 The
patent has three types of claims: method claims, computer-readable
media claims, 83 and system claims.84
76. Id. at 1325.
77. See Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266,
1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Although Ultramercial has ... been vacated by the Supreme Court, we
perceive no flaw in the notion that claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a
validity determination under § 101.").
78. Id. at 1273-74.
79. See id. at 1274-75.
80. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
81. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 685 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated,
484 Fed. App'x. 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
82. Id.
83. Claims drafted in this format had become known as Beauregard claims, an homage
to In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
84. CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting three types of claims).
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The en banc court could not muster a majority opinion as to
any issue. On a seven-to-three vote, the court found the method
claims and the computer-readable media claims invalid. The court
was split five-to-five on the system claims, leaving the district court's
invalidity determination in place.8 5
While the court split sharply as to the substantive law of
eligibility inquiry, underlying that disagreement was an equally
troublesome divide over how to understand the claims. 86 The method
claims did not explicitly recite computer hardware, yet they required
steps that arguably could only be carried out on a computer as a
practical matter.87  The media claims, following standard drafting
conventions, recited a "computer readable storage medium" in the
preamble, but only program code for carrying out various process
steps in the body of the claim.88  The broadest system claims
referenced a "data storage unit" and a "computer" configured to carry
out specified functions,89 while other system claims included more
specific recitations of hardware components.90
As with many claim sets, these claims potentially presented
the court with a number of contested construction issues. However,
presented with the patent challenger's, CLS Bank's, motion. for
summary judgment of ineligibility, the trial court had chosen to
resolve the motion without any predicate claim construction
proceeding, instead presuming to adopt a claim construction allegedly
most favorable to the non-movant patentee, Alice, a construction to
which CLS Bank apparently agreed for purposes of its motion. But
this left the trial court and the Federal Circuit free to speculate about
what the claim terms would have meant to a person having ordinary
skill in the art, and how those terms would have been understood in
view of the intrinsic record.91
85. See id.
86. That divide seems to have continued at the Supreme Court. See Alice Corp. Pty. v.
CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I adhere to the view
that any 'claim that merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a process
under § 101."' (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 614 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1285.
88. Id. at 1287-88.
89. Id. at 1289.
90. Id. at 1306 (Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (examining claim 26).
91. As Judges Linn and O'Malley noted:
[N]o determination has ever been made regarding how one of skill in the art would
understand the claims as of the date of issuance. And, no careful assessment of the
intrinsic record or prosecution history has ever occurred; much of this was never even
made a part of the trial record.
Id. at 1327 (Linn & O'Malley, JJ., dissenting).
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For example, Judge Lourie's opinion prefaced its eligibility
analysis with the observation that:
one cannot meaningfully evaluate whether a claim preempts an abstract idea until the
idea supposedly at risk of preemption has been unambiguously identified. Although not
required, conducting a claim construction analysis before addressing § 101 may be
especially helpful in this regard by facilitating a full understanding of what each claim
entails.9 2
But, for Judge Lourie, obedience to this principle did not require
resort to any formal claim construction process. Indeed, Judge Lourie
proceeded to formulate his own claim construction on the fly en route
to his eligibility determination. After opining that the analysis
required deconstructing the claim language to identify the "inventive
concept" or the "genuine human contribution to the claimed subject
matter,"93 he dismissed the media and method claims as being
insufficiently specific in any explicit or implicit computer
implementation, 94 and then applied the same understanding to the
system claims. In particular, Judge Lourie simply concluded that the
computer implementation was recited in the system claims at a
"striking level of generality," in that the claims recited "a handful of
computer components in generic, functional terms that would
encompass any device capable of performing the same ubiquitous
calculation, storage, and connectivity functions required by the
method claims."95 For Judge Lourie, although the system claims
associated "certain computer components" with processing steps, the
"recited hardware" did not offer any "meaningful limitation" beyond
linking those processing steps to a particular technological
environment.9 6 Of course, he made this assessment without resort to
the traditional tools of claim construction, such as consulting the
specification and prosecution history to determine whether, when
properly construed, those terms might have more significance.
Instead, he relied upon his own sui generis claim deconstruction.
Judges Linn and O'Malley fundamentally disagreed with Judge
Lourie's approach, and it is significant that the core of the
disagreement is about claim construction:
Although Judge Lourie mentions the agreement between the parties and trial court
regarding claim construction, he ignores the substance of the stipulations and
assumptions upon which the proceedings below were predicated-i.e., that the method
claims are narrowed by incorporation of all electronic aspects of the system claims. . ..
92. Id. at 1282 (Lourie, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1283.
94. See id. at 1285-89.
95. Id. at 1290.
96. See id. at 1291.
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He then takes it upon himself to construe the claims, giving the method claims their
broadest possible interpretation in the process.9 7
As Judges Linn and O'Malley saw it, Judge Lourie's opinion started
with a "paraphrased abstraction of the claims" rather than with
proper evidence of claim construction, an approach that "preordain[ed]
the method claims ineligible," 98 then Judge Lourie had read into the
system claims "the same abstraction he felt damned the method
claims." 99
Judges Linn and O'Malley left no doubt that they viewed this
approach to eligibility as fundamentally flawed:
We do not believe a patent eligibility inquiry can be disembodied from the actual claims
at issue, with their attendant limitations. The analytical process in which Judge Lourie
engages is at odds with the most basic concepts that govern our patent system. . . . His
methodology just cannot be right.10 0
For Judges Linn and O'Malley, the correct solution was to view the
method, media, and system claims based on the record that had been
developed below, in which those claims all had been presumed to
include "the same computer-based limitations."tol Necessarily, then,
all of the claims rose or fell together under Judges Linn and O'Malley
approach.102
Former Chief Judge Rader's opinion likewise took issue with
Judge Lourie's approach, insisting that Judge Lourie had failed to
focus on the claim as a whole.103 As Chief Judge Rader put it, "[a]ny
claim can be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or paraphrased to
remove all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something
that could be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed."1 04 The
limitations can become important when "claims tie the otherwise
abstract idea to a specific way of doing something with a computer, or
a specific computer for doing something; if so, they likely will be patent
eligible, unlike claims directed to nothing more than the idea of doing
that thing on a computer." 05 More specifically, "where the claim is
tied to a computer in such a way that the computer plays a
97. Id. at 1330 (Linn & O'Malley, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1331.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1331-32. This brought Judges Linn and O'Malley into conflict with Judges
Rader and Moore, who had viewed the method and media claims as ineligible but the system
claims as eligible. See id. at 1330.
103. See id. at 1298 (Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("A court must
consider the asserted claim as a whole when assessing eligibility. . . . And, a court must consider
the actual language of each claim.").
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1302 (emphasis in original).
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meaningful role in the performance of the claimed invention, and the
claim does not pre-empt virtually all uses of an underlying abstract
idea, the claim is patent eligible." 06 Thus, the claim language, and
necessarily the interpretation of that language, should be of primary
importance in assessing patentable subject matter.
Judge Moore also wrote separately from the joint opinion,
though joined by Chief Judge Rader and Judges Linn and O'Malley, to
express her concern that "the current interpretation of § 101 . .. is
causing a free fall in the patent system."107 She singled out Judge
Lourie's approach of lumping together the method, system, and media
claims, asserting that it might cause "the death of hundreds of
thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system,
and software patents as well as many computer implemented and
telecommunications patents." 08 In her view, the system claims in this
case were undeniably eligible because the "claims are to a system of
tangible machine components with limited specialized functions
programmed consistent with detailed algorithms disclosed in the
patent."109
The resulting dispute over the nature of the claims is, in
essence, a claim construction dispute. Benson itself illustrates much
the same dilemma of an eligibility dispute that has swallowed up an
underlying claim construction issue. Claims 8 and 13 were at
issue-although the Supreme Court seemed to think so little of them
that it dumped them into an appendix to the opinion." 0 Claim 8 was
directed to a "method of converting signals from binary coded decimal
form into binary" and recited seven steps involving signal
manipulation. Several of the steps referred to a "reentrant shift
register."111 Claim 13, by contrast, recited a "data processing method
for converting binary coded decimal number representations into
binary number representations," and included a series of steps in
which the "digit representation[s]" were processed.112
Judge Rich's opinion for the US Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) is illuminating. 11 3 Most importantly, Judge Rich
framed his eligibility analysis by reference to claim construction
principles. To get at the eligibility question, he first had to give the
claim terms "the meaning they would have 'to one of ordinary skill in
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1314.
110. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972).
111. Id. at 73-74.
112. Id. at 74.
113. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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the pertinent art when read in light of and consistently with the
specification."' 1 1 4 He then proceeded to ask whether a "reasonable
interpretation of the claims" would result in a conclusion that the
claims recited nothing more than a series of mental steps.
For Judge Rich, claim 8 presented an easy case in favor of
subject matter eligibility following this analysis. The process as
claimed in claim 8 was to be practiced "in part on particular
apparatus," namely the shift register.115 Judge Rich interpreted "shift
register" by resort to a computer dictionary, which defined "shift
register" as "a hardware element."116 He noted that the claim referred
to "signals," and that a reasonable interpretation of that language in
view of the specification supported the conclusion that the signals
were "of the kind upon which the disclosed electronic computer
operates."117 All of this pointed to eligibility because the claim as
construed was directed to "a machine-implemented process," and "the
apparatus for carrying it out has been disclosed." 18
Judge Rich analyzed claim 13 separately. He acknowledged
that the process as defined in claim 13 could be carried out "by
machine implementation as disclosed in the specification, by still
another machine as disclosed during the prosecution, and even
manually although in actual practice it seems improbable anyone
would ever do that . . . ."11 The claim language did not call for
particular hardware on its face, but Judge Rich placed significance in
the fact that "the supporting disclosure against which the claim must
be reasonably interpreted is the identical programmed digital
computer system which supports claim 8."120 He also found it
important that the process defined in claim 13 had "no practical use"
other than rendering the internal operations of computers more
effective. For Judge Rich, this connection to computers placed the
claimed invention squarely within the domain of the "technological or
useful arts."l 21
One might quarrel with Judge Rich's conclusions-indeed, the
authors might part ways with him on claim 13. But that quarrel
would fundamentally be about claim construction. And such a quarrel
would be resolved primarily through the tools of claim construction,
114. Id. at 687 (quoting In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 895 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 688.
120. Id. at 687.
121. See id.
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which ordinarily would include some consideration of evidence on
what a person of ordinary skill in the art would consider the relevant
claim terms to mean. 122
The contrast between Judge Rich's methodology and that of the
Supreme Court in Benson is even more striking than the fact that the
Court reversed the CCPA. The Supreme Court treated claims 8 and
13 as if they were identical for eligibility purposes. Perhaps the Court
was justified in doing so, particularly if one of ordinary skill in the art
would have read "shift register" as importing no meaningful
limitations to the claim sufficient to avoid preemption. 123 But that
issue should have been played out in the record, not merely assumed
away. Indeed, the PTO Solicitor admitted in oral argument before the
CCPA that the presence of the shift register limitation in claim 8 was
"embarrassing" to the PTO's argument of ineligibility. 12 4
Viewed through the lens of the proximity-complexity problem,
the dilemmas over claim construction presented in both Benson and
Alice are predictable. The predominant substantive eligibility
inquiry-preemption-suffers from an extreme proximity problem
because the rule purports to influence investment decisions to be
undertaken by a remote, future audience.1 25 Substantive eligibility
law, as it is currently formulated, does nothing to address this
problem-but claim construction law might.
In particular, claim construction law might serve as a platform
for developing the sorts of bridging heuristics that can help address
problems of unfavorable proximity. Anchoring eligibility analysis in a
formal claim construction may mean that courts bring to eligibility
analysis an added increment of discipline, or at least the appearance
of added discipline, from filtering the key claim language through
some apparently objectified source, even if it is a hypothetical one.
This approach would discourage any eligibility inquiry that dealt with
claim language, such as "shift register," without any attempt to
consider evidence about how a hypothetical person in the pertinent
community would have construed that language as of the application
122. Or, if not the person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA), then some other
relevant interpretive community. See Golden, supra note 68, at 322, 328; Holbrook & Janis,
supra note 48, at 100. The Supreme Court has now made clear that the views of the PHOSITA,
and other technical information extrinsic to the public record, is factual, and is subject to the
clear error standard of review on appeal. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831,
835 (2015),
123. Indeed, this question is very similar to a question that divided the Federal Circuit in
CLS Bank-namely, determining how a PHOSITA would have understood the recitations of
"computer" and other apparent hardware recitations in the system claims.
124. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d at 687.
125. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
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filing date.126  This approach views a formal claim construction
predicate to the eligibility analysis as presenting an opportunity for
courts to situate the eligibility analysis closer to the prevailing
understandings of the actual innovator community that the eligibility
rules purport to guide.
Stated in the negative, it is problematic to formulate eligibility
rules in a vacuum, without regard for the inevitable interaction
between those rules and other inquiries, such as claim construction.
An eligibility regime operating in that flawed way is effectively a
strategy for subjugating objectified technical considerations that ought
to surface in a proper claim construction process. It may well
exacerbate the problem of proximity by building a legal analysis that
operates under its own independent lexicon. At the very least, when
an eligibility inquiry proceeds without a predicate claim construction,
the court may be missing an opportunity to formulate eligibility rules
that can be more predictably translated into practical guidance for the
research community.
Unfortunately, by treating all of the three different types of
claims in Alice as effectively the same, the Supreme Court left the
lower courts with nearly untrammeled discretion to embrace or ignore
claim language in formulating their eligibility analyses. For those
who seek clear guidance from the courts, the early results have not
been promising. In buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., for example, Judge
Taranto based his eligibility analysis on his perception of what the
claims at issue were "squarely about." 12 7 According to Judge Taranto,
they were "squarely about creating a contractual relationship." 128
That is quite an extraordinary generalization of a claim that read:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving, by at least one computer application program running on a computer of a safe
transaction service provider, a request from a first party for obtaining a transaction
performance guaranty service with respect to an online commercial transaction
following closing of the online commercial transaction;
processing, by at least one computer application program running on the safe
transaction service provider computer, the request by underwriting the first party in
order to provide the transaction performance guaranty service to the first party,
126. This is not the only problem that may arise when eligibility analysis is uncoupled
from claim construction principles. For example, Mayo departs from the conventional approach
to claim construction in a different way: by paying mere lip service to the proposition that claims
are to be considered as a whole. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) ("In
determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under § 101,
their claims must be considered as a whole."). Under the Mayo approach, claim dissection is a
predicate for applying the inventive concept analysis, which is critiqued in Part IV.
127. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
128. Id.
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wherein the computer of the safe transaction service provider offers, via a computer
network, the transaction performance guaranty service that binds a transaction
performance guaranty to the online commercial transaction involving the first party to
guarantee the performance of the first party following closing of the online commercial
transaction. 129
It is, of course, possible that Judge Taranto's characterization
of the claim is correct. But whether it is or is not ought to be analyzed
using the tools of claim construction, with, at least, the benefit of the
appearance of rigor that those tools provide.
Nonetheless, in another post-Alice decision, Content Extraction
& Transmission v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass'n, a Federal
Circuit panel rejected the argument that a claim construction analysis
should have preceded the eligibility analysis. According to Judge
Chen's opinion for the panel, "[a]lthough the determination of patent
eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the
claimed subject matter, claim construction is not an inviolable
prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101."130
In Ultramercial, on remand from the Supreme Court in light of
Alice, Judge Lourie gave a nod to the primacy of the claims,131 but
then deconstructed the claims at issue into eleven steps, "[w]ithout
purporting to construe the claims."1 32  From that deconstruction,
Judge Lourie concluded that "[t]his ordered combination of steps
recites an abstraction," and then proceeded to generalize the claim
even more. 133 There is little, if anything, in the Supreme Court's Alice
decision that would constrain this mode of analyzing eligibility.
The colloquy between Judges Chen and Mayer in another
post-Alice Federal Circuit decision, DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com,
provides a striking example of the proposition that sub silentio tussles
over claim construction underlie most eligibility analyses. In DDR
Holdings, the court reviewed the eligibility of a set of system claims,
including the following:
19. A system useful in an outsource provider serving web pages offering commercial
opportunities, the system comprising:
129. Id. at 1351-52.
130. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, No. 2013-
1588, 2014 WL 7272219, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014) (citing Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
772 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.),
687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The Federal Circuit also pointed out that the trial
court had construed the key language in a way most favorable to the patentee, as required in
reviewing the patent challenger's motion to dismiss. Id.
131. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714 ("We first examine the claims because claims are
the definition of what a patent is intended to cover.").
132. Id.
133. Id. at 715.
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(a) a computer store containing data, for each of a plurality of first web pages, defining a
plurality of visually perceptible elements, which visually perceptible elements
correspond to the plurality of first web pages;
(i) wherein each of the first web pages belongs to one of a plurality of web page owners;
(ii) wherein each of the first web pages displays at least one active link associated with a
commerce object associated with a buying opportunity of a selected one of a plurality of
merchants; and
(iii) wherein the selected merchant, the out-source provider, and the owner of the first
web page displaying the associated link are each third parties with respect to one other;
(b) a computer server at the outsource provider, which computer server is coupled to the
computer store and programmed to:
(i) receive from the web browser of a computer user a signal indicating activation of one
of the links displayed by one of the first web pages;
(ii) automatically identify as the source page the one of the first web pages on which the
link has been activated;
(iii) in response to identification of the source page, automatically retrieve the stored
data corresponding to the source page; and
(iv) using the data retrieved, automatically generate and transmit to the web browser a
second web page that displays: (A) information associated with the commerce object
associated with the link that has been activated, and (B) the plurality of visually
perceptible elements visually corresponding to the source page.1 3 4
Judge Chen's eligibility analysis was premised on particular
recitations in the claim. For Judge Chen, it was significant that the
claim "recites a system that, among other things, 1) stores 'visually
perceptible elements' corresponding to numerous host websites in a
database, with each of the host websites displaying at least one link
associated with a product or service of a third-party merchant, 2) on
activation of this link by a website visitor, automatically identifies the
host, and 3) instructs an Internet web server of an 'out-source
provider' to construct and serve to the visitor a new, hybrid web page
that merges content associated with the products of the third-party
merchant with the stored 'visually perceptible elements' from the
identified host website." 135 According to Judge Chen, these limitations
"specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a
desired result," namely by responding to the click of a hyperlink by
generating and directing the user to a hybrid webpage having product
information from a third party but visual look-and-feel elements from
the original website. 136
134. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., No. 2013-1505, 2014 WL 6845152, at *2-3
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2014).
135. Id. at *10.
136. Id. at *12 (distinguishing the claims at issue from those in Ultramercial, which
Judge Chen characterized as "broadly and generically claim[ing] 'use of the Internet' to perform
an abstract business practice").
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By contrast, Judge Mayer's eligibility analysis, in dissent, was
premised on discarding those very limitations of the claims as "merely
generic."13 7 Judge Mayer viewed the claims as encompassing virtually
any "store within a store" concept. 138 That is, notwithstanding the
lengthy recitations in claim 19, for eligibility purposes, the claim could
be understood as being directed to the concept "that an online
merchant's sales can be increased if two web pages have the same
'look and feel."' 13
9
The eligibility analysis would be better served by a
requirement that it be preceded by a claim construction. It is doubtful
that requiring that the colloquy in DDR Holdings be reframed
explicitly as a claim construction exercise would have brought Judges
Chen and Mayer to consensus on eligibility. Moreover, claim
construction analysis is highly malleable, to put it politely. However,
requiring a predicate claim construction might at least provide some
common frame for the debate. DDR Holdings is a striking illustration
in this regard as well. Both judges made at least some attempt to
justify their respective positions by referring to claim language and
some aspects of the specification, but nothing in Alice required them to
do even that much.
These emerging approaches demonstrate that, even in a
post-Alice world, claim construction underlies many of the disputes in
this area. To be sure, interjecting the troubled exercise of claim
construction into the even more troubled jurisprudence of
patent-eligibility and calling that progress, might seem unduly
optimistic. Indeed, claim construction rules have tended to suffer
from proximity problems of their own, as we have pointed out in prior
work. 140 The Federal Circuit has tended to give the person of ordinary
skill in the art a relatively limited role in guiding claim construction
determinations, except where those determinations are said to turn on
the "customary and ordinary meaning" of claim terms. 141 Nor is it
clear that the person of ordinary skill in the art is the most promising
of potential bridging heuristics. 142 At least the Supreme Court finally
resolved the crucial issue of the standard of review for claim
137. See id. at *17 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at *18.
139. Id. at *17.
140. See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 48, at 93-100 (arguing that the debate over claim
construction canons has focused too much on complexity and not enough on proximity).
141. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J.
779, 788-92 (2011) (discussing removal of PHOSITA from claim construction).
142. Holbrook & Janis, supra note 48, at 100.
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construction. 143 But given the choice between: (1) yet another cycle of
futility in eligibility jurisprudence concerning process inventions, and
(2) a fresh focus on claim construction with the promise of some
potential improvement in the quality of substantive eligibility
rules-option (2) is the better choice.
IV. ELIGIBILITY CREEP: THE "INVENTIVE CONCEPT" AS A COMPONENT
OF THE ELIGIBILITY INQUIRY
The preceding Parts have suggested that eligibility analysis
could be improved by viewing it as a proximity-complexity problem
and developing ways to reduce unfavorable proximity. This Part
argues that the Court's current eligibility jurisprudence for process
inventions presents a more troubling trend. If eligibility analysis
essentially supplants a traditional novelty and nonobviousness
analysis through a newly aggressive application of the "inventive
concept" approach to eligibility, the patentability analysis, as a whole,
will become less tethered to audience considerations. Eligibility
creep-or, more precisely, the extension of the methodology embodied
in current eligibility analysis, perhaps under the banner of
"eligibility-as-king"-is likely to be counterproductive for the
patentability analysis more generally.
Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court in Mayo1 44 evinces the
fullest embrace of the eligibility-as-king philosophy in the Court's
143. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). Prior to
Teva, the tension over the standard of review was also evident in the Federal Circuit's eligibility
cases, especially CLS Bank. As Judges Linn and O'Malley viewed it:
We assume our colleagues feel free to ignore the record-or, more appropriately, the
lack thereof-in this case because claim construction is a question of law which this
court reviews de novo. Whether review is de novo or not, however, it still must be a
"review"-it must be premised on a record below in which all relevant
claim construction issues were vetted and in which the parties had an opportunity to
proffer intrinsic and extrinsic evidence which would inform the
claim construction process. None of that occurred in this case. Instead, Alice's
evidence and arguments were proffered and accepted by all as established fact. We
are not persons of skill in the art and cannot open the record for proceedings that did
not occur below. We are a reviewing court whose review must be predicated upon the
record presented.
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1331-32 (Linn & O'Malley, JJ., dissenting)
(citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
Relatedly, one may wonder about the designation of the eligibility inquiry as a question of law.
Compare Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (analyzing eligibility inquiry as a question of law), with Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (asserting that Section 101, "while ultimately a
legal determination, is rife with underlying factual issues"). Now that it is clear that aspects of
claim construction are factual, the courts might be better off recognizing that eligibility
determinations, as well may turn on matters that are best deemed to be underlying technical
facts.
144. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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modern jurisprudence. The Court declared that certain claims that
were directed to a method of calibrating the dosage of a drug provided
to a patient failed to define eligible subject matter. 145 Specifically,
claim 1 required the steps of administering a thiopurine drug to a
patient having an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder and
determining the level of 6-thioguanine in the patient's blood, where a
level below a specified threshold indicated a need to increase the
amount of drug subsequently administered to the patient, and a level
above a specified threshold indicated a need to decrease the dosage.1 46
The Court determined that the correlation recited in the claims
between the drug dosage and the physiological response was a law of
nature, and that the additional recitations in the claims did not add
enough to the law of nature to transform the claim into a
patent-eligible application of that law.14 7
In making this critical determination as to whether the claim
recitations added sufficiently to the recited natural correlation, the
Court endorsed a search for the "inventive concept" embodied in the
claim. That is, process claims that "focuse[d] upon the use of a natural
law" must also recite 'an inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the natural law itself."148  Applying this test, the Court
determined, first, that claim 1 did recite a law of nature-specifically,
"relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the
blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove
ineffective or cause harm."149 Next, the Court decided that the claim
did not add sufficient recitations to that natural correlation to
transform it into a patent-eligible method. According to the Court, the
claims merely informed doctors about the correlation; the additional
recitations consisted of "well-understood, routine, conventional
activity already engaged in by the scientific community."150 When
145. See id. at 1294.
146. Id. at 1295. The Court took claim 1 as representative. See id.
147. See id. at 1298; see also id. at 1297 ("To put the matter more precisely, do the patent
claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to
qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?"); id. at 1294 ("[Als the Court has
also made clear, to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of
such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words 'apply
it."').
148. Id. at 1294.
149. Id. at 1296. The Court explained that although it took "human action," namely, the
administration of the drug, to "trigger a manifestation of this relation in a particular person, the
relation itself exists in principle apart from any human action" because it was simply a
"consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body." Id. at
1297. Hence, the relation was an "entirely natural process]." Id.
150. Id. at 1298.
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viewed as a whole, those recitations added "nothing significant beyond
the sum of their parts taken separately."15 1
The Supreme Court reiterated this approach in Alice,
specifically requiring "additional features" in the claim that is more
than a "drafting effort" designed to claim the abstract idea. 152
Although the system claims in Alice required a computer, "[t]he
introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis
at Mayo step two." 1 53  In fact, "the mere recitation of a generic
computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention."1 54 Moreover, "[tlaking the claim elements
separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the
process is '[p]urely conventional."155
It seems apparent from the passages in Mayo and Alice that
the "inventive concept" inquiry permits courts to undertake a
quasi-Section 102 and 103 analysis for patentability over the prior
art,156 without the need to qualify any single piece of evidence as prior
art or consult the immense jurisprudence of Sections 102 or 103. But
the Court expressly rejected the argument that it was problematic to
commingle the Section 101 eligibility analysis with the Section 102
and 103 novelty and nonobviousness analysis in this fashion. Indeed,
the Court acknowledged that in evaluating "the significance of
additional steps" beyond the natural law, "the § 101 patent-eligibility
inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes
overlap."157 Nevertheless, according to the Court, its approach to
Section 101 eligibility analysis was justified on the basis of
(1) precedent; and (2) the need to bring certainty to eligibility analysis.
Neither justification holds water. The Court's resort to
precedent-specifically its Flook and Diehr decisions-was brazenly
revisionist. Flook involved a claim that recited a mathematical
formula, and the Court seemed to call for an eligibility analysis that
entailed segregating the mathematical formula from the other
recitations of the claim and then asking whether those other
recitations reflected some inventive concept going beyond the
151. Id.
152. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) (quoting Mayo,
132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2358.
155. Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298).
156. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012).
157. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1304.
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mathematical formulaM6 8 -in other words, an analysis much like that
in Mayo.15 9
However, three years after Flook,60  the Court in Diehrl61
discarded this very approach in unmistakable language:
In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection
under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect
the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old
elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of
the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made.
The "novelty" of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter. 16 2
The Court in Mayo does not deal with this language; indeed, the Mayo
approach is much closer to that of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion
in Diehr. The Court seems quite reticent to revisit its case law-in
any patent context for that matter-to evaluate whether its doctrine is
consistent. Instead of grappling with the inconsistencies in its own
decisions, the Court simply recites facts and holdings from its earlier
jurisprudence in the hopes that one can discern consistencies. One
cannot, and the Section 101 jurisprudence suffers as a result. 163
Nor did the Mayo Court fare much better in its claim that its
approach to eligibility places the analysis on the path to greater
certainty. The Mayo opinion made the astonishing claim that relying
predominantly on novelty and nonobviousness to distinguish
158. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978).
159. This analysis is also the sort that Congress created in the America Invents Act for
the assessment of patents on tax strategies, although for purposes of assessing novelty and
nonobviousness. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 14(a), 125 Stat. 284,
327 (2011) ("For purposes of evaluating an invention under section 102 or 103 of title 35, United
States Code, any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or
unknown at the time of the invention or application for patent, shall be deemed insufficient to
differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art."). That Congress situated this comparable
analysis in the context of anticipation and obviousness, however, shows the error the Supreme
Court has made-considerations of how "new" the invention is should not be part of the
threshold issue of whether the subject matter is eligible for patent protection at all.
160. In Mayo, the Court discussed Diehr first, and then Flook, as if look modified Diehr.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1298-1300.
161. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
162. Id. at 188-89 (citing, inter alia, legislative history on the distinction between
Sections 101 and 102).
163. For an attempt to reconcile the Court's pronouncements about the inventive step
inquiry in Flook, Diehr, and Mayo, see Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc'ns Inc., No. 2:13-CV-
07245-MRP, 2014 WL 5661290, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014). The court notes that Diehr
rejected Flook's point-of-novelty approach, and while Mayo did require courts to ignore well
understood, routine, conventional activity, "neither Mayo nor any other precedent defines
conventional elements to include everything found in prior art. Rather than relying on Kook,
courts must follow the guidance of Diehr, which discourages" dissection of the claim into old and
new elements. Id.
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patentable from unpatentable inventions "risks creating significantly
greater legal uncertainty" than relying on Section 101 eligibility. 164
According to Mayo, Section 101 eligibility is "the better established
inquiry." 165 The Court went so far as to claim that its case law had
endorsed "a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature,
mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat
more easily administered proxy" for the concern about preempting
basic building blocks of nature than did other patent criteria.1 6 6 But
years of experience in attempting to apply the Court's "bright-line"
standard bely the claim of certainty. The law of patent eligibility was
chaotic in the 1970s as courts grappled with the conflicting rhetoric in
Benson, Flook, and Diehr,16 7 and the progression from Bilski to Mayo
and Alice in the current jurisprudence is eerily similar.
The Federal Circuit's multiple opinions in Alice also reflect the
eligibility creep. Much of the disagreement at the en banc Federal
Circuit involved the role of the "inventive concept," which Judge
Lourie embraced and other judges readily rejected. The purpose of
identifying the inventive concept, aside from jettisoning claim
construction, is to assess whether the concept would preempt
subsequent uses of the idea. Importantly though, the inventive
concept "must represent more than a trivial appendix to the
underlying abstract idea. . . . Limitations that represent a human
contribution but are merely tangential, routine, well-understood, or
conventional, or in practice fail to narrow the claim relative to the
fundamental principle therein, cannot confer patent eligibility." 16 8
The only way to make such an assessment is to compare the
limitations to what is known in the art to assess their technical
importance, which of course harkens to the same inquiry as
obviousness under Section 103. Although many of the judges
disagreed with Judge Lourie's approach, 169  it nevertheless
demonstrates how eligibility creep can take place.
The Federal Circuit's opinions applying the Supreme Court's
two-part Alice test suggest that eligibility creep is continuing
164. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1303.
167. See generally Thomas, supra note 13, at 1153-63 (cataloguing struggle in Federal
Circuit precedent post-Diehr, particularly the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and Alappat).
168. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J.,
concurring).
169. See id. at 1302-03 (Rader, C.J., Linn, Moore, & O'Malley, JJ., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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unabated. 170 In theory, this is not inevitable: the Court's two-part test
could be used to constrain the inventive concept inquiry by confining it
to step two of the test, where it in fact resides. But the Federal
Circuit's opinions tend to use inventive concept rhetoric in deciding
the first step of the test, whether the claim is directed to an abstract
concept, frequently leaving the court little more to do other than
repeat itself in analyzing the second step. 171  For example, in
buySAFE, the court concluded that the claims at issue were deemed to
fail the abstractness step because they encompassed a concept "that is
beyond question of ancient lineage." 172 In Content Extraction, the
claims failed that step because they recited "well-known" concepts.173
All of this is important for this Article's general argument
about audience effects. By installing the "inventive concept" as a
component of the eligibility analysis, and by frankly acknowledging
that eligibility might supplant the novelty and nonobviousness
analysis, the Court does more than merely exemplify an
eligibility-as-king approach that would be wrongheaded. It does
exactly what the audience perspective reveals as problematic: it
entitles a court to kick the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the
art to the curb in favor of a discretionary analysis that need not be
constrained by the need to establish qualifying prior art evidence, by
the need to develop doctrinal checks against judicial hindsight, or by
any of the other innovations that have been developed in over two
170. Judge Mayer appears to acknowledge and applaud this development. See, e.g.,
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 722 n.2 ("Some charge that if patent eligibility
turns on the disclosure of technology that is both 'new' and clearly delineated, section 101 will
subsume the non-obviousness and adequate written description inquiries set out in subsequent
sections of the Patent Act. The simple fact, however, is that this court's approach to sections
103 and 112 has proved woefully inadequate in preventing a deluge of very poor quality
patents.").
171. Indeed, in one case, Digitech, the court did not clearly separate its analysis as
between the first and second steps at all. See Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging,
Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The court characterized the claim as reciting the
process of taking two data sets and combining them into a single data set, which, it concluded,
was directed to "an ineligible abstract process of gathering and combining data that does not
require input from a physical device." Id. at 1351. The court then concluded that "[w]ithout
additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing
information to generate additional information is not patent eligible." Id.
172. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Its analysis
of the second step of the Alice test seems a bit of an afterthought and largely redundant of the
first step. See id. (critiquing the invocation of computer functionality in the claims as "generic"
and merely "limited" in significance).
173. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, No.
2013-1588, 2014 WL 7272219, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014) ("The concept of data collection,
recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have always performed
these functions. And banks have, for some time, reviewed checks, recognized relevant data such
as the amount, account number, and identity of account holder, and stored that information in
their records.").
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hundred years of American jurisprudence on patentability over the
prior art.
None of this answers the normative question as to whether
such discretion could be a good thing. As an administrative matter,
such discretion allows various bodies-courts and the PTO-to make
determinations of subject matter eligibility on relatively thin records,
without the need for consulting experts because of the absence of the
perspective of the person having ordinary skill in the art. But this
could also be viewed as a significant bug in the ointment of the patent
system: uncabined discretion to reject claims does not facilitate an
orderly and predictable patent regime with considerable costs to
innovative companies. In making assessments of whether to seek
patent protection, as opposed to other potential protection
mechanisms such as trade secrecy, innovators will have far greater
difficulty discerning whether their invention is deemed patentable by
the PTO and then eventually by the courts. To the extent this
generates uncertainty and that we believe patent disclosures are
important to an innovation system, 174 then one should pause to
consider whether the current eligibility doctrine will encourage
greater trade secrecy on the margins. This Article agrees with the
latter-that the absence of a bridging heuristic creates problems for
the patent system that could be and should be resolved.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's patentable subject matter jurisprudence,
historically and presently, has offered only confusion and uncertainty.
As one district court has characterized the two-step approach of Mayo
and Alice, "the two-step test may be more like a one step test evocative
of Justice Stewart's most famous phrase," that he knows it when he
sees it.1 75 The doctrine is wholly isolated from the ultimate
audience-the inventing community-to a degree unmatched by other
areas of patent law. This separation is a cause for concern for the
impact it could have on patent law's incentives. Indeed, the doctrine
governing patent-eligible subject matter is truly an odd duck,
particularly when compared to other patentability requirements.
174. One of the authors has challenged the robustness of the quid pro quo view of the
patent system. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. Rev. 123, 132-46
(2006).
175. McRO, Inc. v. Atlus U.S.A., No. SACV 13-1870-GW(FFMx), 2014 WL 4772196, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) ("I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed
in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
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Those other doctrines either provide a basis of comparison, such as the
prior art or the patent disclosure, or are framed with reference to the
constructed person having ordinary skill in the art. Patentable
subject matter has neither.
The Supreme Court, therefore, missed the opportunity in Alice
to correct its misstep in Mayo. In fact, the Court exacerbated that
error by making the two-step analysis of Mayo "the" test for patent
eligibility, somewhat in tension with its rejection of any definitive
tests in Bilski. One may actually become wistful for the somewhat
formalistic inquiry that the machine-or-transformation test provided,
in light of the vague notions adopted by the Supreme Court.
Given the level of discretion provided by the Court, however,
one hopes that the Federal Circuit and other lower courts will resist
either of two temptations. First, this Article posits that courts should
work to interpret the Supreme Court's guidance in a way that
preserves some aspect of eligibility, particularly for some software and
other process claims, and thus should resist the "eligibility-as-king"
and slayer approach. The Federal Circuit's recent decision in DDR
Holdings affords some optimism in that regard. Relatedly, one hopes
that the lower courts will resist the temptation to simply adhere to the
ad hoc rationalizations of the Supreme Court and instead will work to
develop some sort of bridging heuristics to allow the "translators" of
the law-patent and other attorneys-to communicate the law more
readily to their clients. Whether this effort takes place by creating
greater consideration of patent claims and their limitations-in effect,
requiring something akin to claim construction-or requiring more
robust evidentiary considerations of what constitutes "conventional"
activity, hopefully the courts will work to create more predictable
limits as to such considerations. Whether the person having ordinary
skill in the art or some other heuristic is the most appropriate, this
Article leaves for another day. But the Supreme Court has failed to
consider the proximity dynamic in addressing the law of patentable
subject matter, and the law is worse off for it.
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